Simultaneous Optimization of Road Tolls and Tradable Credits in Public-private Mixed Networks by Nan Jiang et al.
Promet – Traffic&Transportation, Vol. 29, 2017, No. 6, 603-611 603
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates a hybrid management policy of 
road tolls and tradable credits in mixed road networks with 
both public and private roads. In the public sub-network, a 
tradable credit scheme is applied to mitigate traffic conges-
tion. In the private sub-network, tolls are collected by the 
private company, but the toll levels and toll locations are 
determined by the government. The purpose of toll charge 
is two-fold: on the one hand, the government uses it as a 
tool for mitigating congestion; on the other hand, a threshold 
of revenue should be guaranteed for the profitability of the 
private company. A bi-level programming model is formulat-
ed to minimize the total travel time in the network by tak-
ing into account the user equilibrium travel behaviour and 
the revenue requirement of private firms. To obtain a global 
optimum solution, the bi-level model is transformed into an 
equivalent single-level mixed integer linear program that can 
be easily solved with commercial software. Numerical exam-
ples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
developed model and the efficiency of the proposed algo-
rithm. It is shown that the mixed management schemes can 
achieve favourable targets, namely, joint implementation of 
road tolls and tradable credits can effectively mitigate traffic 
congestion and meanwhile maintain reasonable revenue for 
the private company.
KEY WORDS
bi-level programming model; road tolls; tradable credits; 
mixed integer linear program; public-private mixed networks;
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past decades, substantial transportation 
infrastructure has been developed via private invest-
ment, especially in developing countries. For example, 
in China, transportation networks in several provinces 
have been substantially expanded in the form of pri-
vate roads. Nevertheless, in both highway and urban 
road networks, public roads are still the major part of 
the transportation system. Therefore, a real network 
system often exists in the public-private mixed situa-
tion.
There are several management targets for the op-
eration of the public-private mixed networks, due to the 
complicated benefit considerations of different stake-
holders. First, with the steady growth of travel demand, 
transportation networks are often congested. There-
fore the primal management goal of the government is 
to alleviate traffic congestion, especially in metropoli-
tan areas. Second, for private firms, a reasonable level 
of revenue is necessary in order to ensure investment 
return, and to cover road maintenance cost.
Road pricing has long been recognized as an ef-
fective instrument for mitigating congestion and col-
lecting revenue. The theoretical mechanism of road 
pricing is the principle of marginal cost pricing in eco-
nomics that a traveller has to pay the cost they impose 
on others [1-5]. However, marginal cost pricing re-
quires that tolls be charged on all links. Given the fact 
that it is almost impossible to collect tolls on all roads, 
many researchers turn to investigate second-best 
pricing schemes that only a subset of road links are 
charged, such as send-best link based tolls, cordon 
tolls, entry-exit based tolls and distance-based tolls 
[6-10]. On the other hand, tolls are also implemented 
on private roads in order to maintain a profitable situ-
ation of the private investors. For example, de Palma 
[11] developed a competition model based on simple 
networks with two parallel links, where each link was 
controlled by a private firm. Yang and Meng [12] con-
sidered the simultaneous determination of road tolls 
and link capacities on the private roads, while taking 
into account the network equilibrium. Yang and Woo 
[13] investigated the Nash equilibrium between two 
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Meanwhile, in the private sub-network, the government 
franchises private firms to collect tolls, but toll levels 
and locations are determined by the government with 
the aim of alleviating traffic congestion. Meanwhile, 
the government guarantees private firms to obtain 
acceptable revenues. The management problem is 
formulated as a bi-level optimization structure as in 
[22]. The upper level model minimizes the total trav-
el cost, considering toll/credit charging levels and lo-
cations as decision variables. The revenue threshold 
and the numbers of toll and credit charging links are 
incorporated as constraints into the upper level model. 
The lower level model describes the user equilibrium 
(UE) behaviour of travellers, given the tolls and credits 
transferred from the upper level.
Due to the complicated structure of the bi-level 
model, it is very difficult to obtain a global optimum 
of the problem with gradient-based methods. Then 
the bi-level optimization model is transformed into a 
single-level problem, by replacing the lower level user 
equilibrium (UE) program with its equivalent first-order 
conditions. Motivated by two seminal works [23-24], 
the UE conditions, travel time functions and charge 
location constraints are replaced by a set of linear 
equations through introducing some mixed integer 
variables. Therefore, the bi-level model is eventual-
ly transformed into a mixed integer linear program 
(MILP). Thus global optimum of the mixed manage-
ment problem can be obtained by employing a com-
mercial computing package, such as CPLEX.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as 
follows. In the following Section 2, we introduce the 
bi-level formulation of joint implementation of tradable 
credits and link tolls. In Section 3, the bi-level model 
is transferred into a single-level optimization problem, 
namely, a mixed integer linear program. Numerical 
examples are given in Section 4 and conclusions are 
provided in Section 5.
2. BI-LEVEL FORMULATION OF TOLL AND 
TRADABLE CREDIT MIXED SCHEME
Let G(N, A) be a typical public-private mixed road 
network defined by a set N of nodes and a set A of 
directed links. The network contains public roads and 
private roads. Set A1 denotes the link set of public 
roads, and set A2 denotes the link set of the private 
roads, A= A1jA2. Let W denote the set of origin-des-
tination (O-D) pairs, and RW be the set of paths con-
necting O-D pair w, w!W. Let va be the flow on the link 
a!A, and ta(va) be the travel time on link a!A, which is 
a continuous, convex and strictly increasing function 
of the link flow va. Let v=(va, a!A) denote the vector of 
link flow.
profit maximizing firms that controlled their own road 
links, respectively. Xiao et al. [14] analysed the toll and 
capacity competition among private asymmetric roads 
in a network with parallel links. Their results indicated 
that an oligopolistic competition generates higher toll 
and lower construction capacity than those in the case 
of social optimum. Wu et al. [15] demonstrated math-
ematically that in general road networks the service 
level provided by a profit-maximizing private firm was 
independent of another competitor’s capacity and toll 
decision. Moreover, the volume versus capacity ratio 
remains the same even in a regulated market where 
the authority imposes a cap for the generalized travel 
cost on the private toll road.
Overall, congestion pricing is difficult to implement 
due to the objection of the public, since the govern-
ments are often criticized for collecting tolls on public 
roads. The good news is that researchers found new 
congestion mitigation methods, where travellers do 
not pay monetary cost to public authorities. For exam-
ple, Yang and Wang [16], Xiao et al. [17] explored the 
mechanism of tradable mobility credits in transporta-
tion networks. In these policies, the government sets a 
goal and tries to achieve it by developing a market for 
free trading of mobility credits. Management authori-
ties issue mobility credits to all eligible travellers, and 
determine how many credits are to be charged on each 
road. Once the management authority makes right de-
cisions on credit provisions and link-based charges, 
the competitive market could spontaneously lead to 
a system optimum. The tradable credits scheme has 
some obvious advantages for the management of 
public roads. The scheme ensures high equity for the 
travellers as a public service, so it can avoid the polit-
ical resistance due to the concern of unfairness. Most 
importantly, in the tradable credits scheme, the rev-
enue-neutral attribution makes it more acceptable to 
the public. Recent development on the tradable cred-
it in transportation network includes the work of Nie 
[18], where the effects of transaction costs in an ar-
tificial auction market and negotiated market were in-
vestigated. Wang et al. [19] proposed a bi-level model 
for a tradable credit scheme with equity constraints for 
the continuous network design problem. Grant-Muller 
and Xu [20] provided a complete review of the role 
of tradable credit schemes in road traffic congestion 
management. He et al. [21] studied tradable credit 
schemes on networks with different types of users.
With the purposes of mitigating congestion and 
maintain a reasonable revenue to the investors, a hy-
brid management scheme was proposed to improve 
the performance of the public-private mixed net-
work. The entire network is divided into two sub-net-
works, namely, the public sub-network and the private 
sub-network. In the public sub-network, a tradable 
credit scheme is applied to mitigate traffic congestion 
by optimizing the credit charging levels and locations. 
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where uw represents the minimal travel cost of O–D 
pair w!W. Without loss of generality, we assume the 
unit price of credit p![0,1]. According to the Conditions 
8 and 9, if there is a surplus of credit, the credits have 
no market value; namely, the price is zero.
Now the upper level optimization model is intro-
duced. The management authority wants to minimize 
the total travel time in the network by implementing 
joint toll and credit scheme (simultaneously setting 
credit/toll levels and determining tolling locations). In 
addition, the number of toll /credit links is restricted, 
and profitable revenue for the private firm should be 
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where va(σa,c, σa,b, ka, K, ta) is the solution of the UE 
problem. Nc is the maximal number of public road links 
that are allowed to implement tradable credit scheme. 
Nb is the maximal number of private road links that are 
permitted to be tolled. P is the revenue threshold for 
private firm, which depends on the franchise contract. 
Constraints 14-16 give the three practical requirements. 
3. EQUIVALENT SINGLE-LEVEL MIXED 
INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAM 
Due to the complicated structure of the aforemen-
tioned bi-level model in Section 2, it is very difficult to 
obtain a global optimum solution with gradient-based 
methods. Therefore, in the section, a global solution 
algorithm is proposed by transforming the non-linear 
bi-level program into an equivalent single-level mixed 
integer linear program (MILP). The transformation 
In this study, the management authority attempts 
to improve the network performance by simultaneous-
ly implementing a tradable credit scheme in the public 
sub-network and a toll charging scheme in the private 
sub-network.
Let p denote the unit price of credit per unit, and 
k=(ka, a!A1) denote the credit allocation scheme, 
where ka is the credit to be charged on link a, a!A1. 
Let (k,K) denote a credit scheme k with total amount 
of credit K. Let xpr=(ta, a!A2) denote the toll set in the 
private sub-network, where ta is the toll level on link 
a, a!A2. We introduce two binary variables σa,b and 
σa,c, to indicate whether a link is selected for toll/credit 
candidates or not. Here σa,c is used to indicate wheth-
er link a, a!A1 is selected to collect mobility credit. If 
σa,c=1, link a is the candidate link of credit charge, oth-
erwise σa,c=0. Similarly, σa,b is used to indicate wheth-
er link a, a!A2 is a candidate location for toll charge. If 
σa,b=1, link a is a candidate toll link, otherwise σa,b=0.
It is naturally assumed that travellers follow a ra-
tional route choice behaviour of user equilibrium; 
namely, no one can reduce their travel cost by unilat-
erally changing the route. Given a mixed toll and credit 
charging scheme (k, K; xpr), the user equilibrium (UE) 
problem can be formulated as follows
min t d, ,
v
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where δa,c and δa,b are two binary indicators. If link 
a belongs to the set of public roads, i.e. a!A1, then 
δa,c=1 and δa,b=0. If link a belongs to the set of pri-
vate roads, i.e. a!A2, then δa,c=0 and δa,b=1. Symbol 
fr,w represents the traffic flow on route r!Rw, w!W. 
Link-path incidence indicator δwa,r equals 1 if route r be-
tween O–D pair w!W uses link a!A, and 0 otherwise. 
Constraints 2 and 3 are the link-path incidence and de-
mand conservation conditions, respectively. Constraint 
5 ensures the feasibility of tradable credit scheme 
(i.e., the amount of collected credit cannot exceed the 
amount of issued credit).
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A similar method used in Section 3.1 can be ap-
plied. Thus, we get the approximation:
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where coefficient lan is determined by derivatives of 
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and coefficient zan is given by:



















































So far, we have finished the linearization of the ob-
jective function. 
3.3 Linearization of constraints
In the developed bi-level optimization model, Con-
straints 14 and 15 are linear, but Constraint 16 is non-lin-
ear. The same linearization method can be applied to 
transform the non-linear Constraint 16 into equivalent 
linear conditions by introducing a set of binary vari-
ables. As for the user equilibrium constraint in the low-
er level, it can be replaced by the first order conditions; 
namely, a set of non-linear complementary conditions. 
Fortunately, they can be transformed into equivalent 
linear constraints by incorporating a set of integer vari-
ables; the detailed procedure and formulations can be 
found in Wang and Lo [23] and Zhang and van Wee 
[22]. To save space, we do not display the entire linear-
ized formulation of the lower level program. The refor-
mulated MILP model can be efficiently solved by some 
commercial solvers, e.g., CPLEX and GUROBI.
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, some numerical experiments are 
carried out to test the model and hopefully to obtain 
some insightful implications. More specifically, we 
want to see the varying patterns of the system travel 
cost against the revenue threshold, and the number 
of toll roads. The used transportation network is de-
picted in Figure 1. The network consists of 13 nodes 
and 19 links. Four OD pairs are considered. The travel 
includes linearization of the design objective function, 
link travel time function and the involved non-linear 
constraints. 
3.1 The linearization of travel time function
In the study, the typical BPR function is used to de-
fine the link travel time as below:





a0 6 !a= -
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wheret t0a denotes the free flow travel time and ca is the 
link capacity. Further, it is explained how to linearize 
the travel time function. a and b are the parameters in 
the BPR function. 
It is not difficult to see that the non-linear travel 
time function is with respect to decision variable va. 
Following Wang and Lo [23], we approximate the link 
travel time function by a set of piecewise linear func-
tions. Let [va_ , va‾ ] be the feasible domain of link flow 
va. We then partition the domain into M segments, 
where  M is a sufficiently large integer. Without loss 
of generality, the partitioned segments are ordered 
as va_ <ga,n<ga,n+1<va‾ , n=1,...,M-1. It follows from the 
first-order Taylor series that, for each feasible region 
[ga,n, ga,n+1], we can obtain the following approximation 
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where L is a very large negative constant and U is a 
very large positive constant; e is a very small positive 
constant; la,n, ξa,n are the auxiliary variables that help 
determine the feasible domain of va. aan and ban are co-
efficients to be determined. Accordingly, coefficient aan 
is determined by derivatives of the travel time function 




















Similarly, coefficient ban can be given by
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3.2 Linearization of the non-linear objective 
function
Let sa(va)=ta(va)va. Then, the objective function in 
the upper level can be rewritten as:
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Experiment A
In the experiment, we demonstrate the perfor-
mance of our model and discuss the management 
effects of the mixed charging scheme by varying the 
number of toll roads. All public roads are assumed to 
be considered as candidate locations of credit charge. 
The revenue threshold in Constraint 16 is set to be P=0, 
i.e., the private firm does not have a requirement on 
revenue.
Based on the bi-level model and its mixed integer 
linear reformulation, we compute the optimal toll lev-
els and locations when the number of toll links is set to 
be 0, 1, 3, 5, and 8, respectively. The results are shown 
in Figure 2 and Table 3, which provide the optimal toll 
locations and toll levels, as well as the corresponding 
total travel time of the whole network. When no link is 
subject to toll charge; namely, only the tradable credit 
scheme is applied; the total travel time of the network 
is 5.749 · 105, which is a substantial decrease com-
pared with the UE situation. If only one link is allowed 
for toll charge, link 9 is the optimal toll location. The 
optimal toll is 51.80, and the corresponding total trav-
el time is 5.741 · 105 in the situation. As the number 
of toll links increases, total travel time of the network 
decreases. When five links are allowed for toll charge, 
the network total travel time decreases to the system 
optimum situation. Therefore, when the number of toll 
links increases to eight, although different solutions 
of toll locations and toll levels are obtained, the total 
travel time of the network cannot further decrease 
any longer. This experiment shows that only applying 
tradable credit scheme can have a very acceptable im-
provement in terms of system travel time reduction. 
Moreover, the system can be further improved by im-
plementing toll charge, and the system optimum can 
be achieved by charging only a subset of private links.
Experiment B
The second experiment is used to study the effects 
of the hybrid management by simultaneously varying 
the numbers of toll links and credit links. We go over 
all the combinations of the numbers of toll and credit 
demands of these OD pairs are given in Table 1. The 
free flow travel times and the capacities of the links 
are provided in Table 2. Links 1, 6, 8-10, 12-13 and 17 
are private roads (solid lines), and others are public 
roads (dash-dot lines). And we evaluate the param-
eters a=0.15, b=4 that were used in [22]. The tradi-
tional traffic assignment shows that the total travel 
time of the network is 5.850 105 at user equilibrium 
and 5.725 · 105 at system optimum. To analyse the 
effects of the hybrid management policy proposed in 
the paper, the commercial optimization software IBM-
ILOG-CPLEX-12.6 is utilized to solve the reformulated 
mixed integer linear program. The following three ex-





































Figure 1 – A thirteen-node transportation network.
Table 1 – Travel demands for the OD pairs
OD pair 1→2 1→3 4→2 4→3
Demand 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000
Table 2 – Free-flow times and capacities of the links
Link 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
t0a 4.35 4.28 4.16 3.92 3.89 4.86 4.28 5.91 4.09 4.92
ca 3,000 2,000 3,000 2,000 6,000 2,000 6,000 2,000 3,000 3,000
Link 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
t0a 4.29 5.62 4.21 4.26 5.73 4.31 2 4.36 4.89
ca 6,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 1,000
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a) One toll link b) Three toll link















Figure 2 – Results of the toll level and location 
Table 3 – The results of the toll level and location
Max no. of toll links Total travel time Optimal toll links
Optimal tolls
Link Toll
0 5.749 · 105 - - -
1 5.741 · 105 9 9 51.80
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The other two cases are in between the aforemen-
tioned two situations. As the required revenue increas-
es, the increasing speed of the system travel time is 
also between the two aforementioned situations. By 
comparing the four situations, it can be clearly seen 
that the sensitivity of revenue to total travel time is 
negatively related with the number of the toll and cred-
it links. In other words, when the number of toll and 
credit links is small, the system travel time increases 
rapidly with the required revenue. With more toll links 
and credit links, the system travel time increases much 
























eleven credit links, one toll link
eleven credit links, eight toll link
zero credit links, one toll link
zero credit links, eight toll link
Figure 4 – Relationship between private revenue and total 
travel time
5. CONCLUSIONS
The paper investigates a hybrid management pol-
icy of road tolls and tradable credits in mixed road 
networks with both public and private roads. The en-
tire network is divided into two sub-networks, namely, 
the public sub-network and the private sub-network. 
In the public sub-network, a tradable credit scheme 
is applied to mitigate traffic congestion. In the private 
sub-network, tolls are collected by the private compa-
ny, but the toll levels and toll locations are determined 
by the government. The purpose of toll charge is two-
fold, on one hand, the government uses it as a tool of 
mitigating congestion, on the other hand, a threshold 
of revenue should be guaranteed for the profitability of 
the private company.
Due to the complicated structure of the bi-level 
model, it is very difficult to obtain a global optimum 
of the problem with gradient-based methods. Then 
the bi-level optimization model is transformed into a 
single-level problem, by replacing the lower level user 
equilibrium (UE) program with its equivalent first-order 
conditions. Motivated by two seminal works, the UE 
conditions, travel time functions and charge location 
constraints are replaced by a set of linear equations 
through introducing some mixed integer variables. 
Therefore, the bi-level model is eventually trans-
formed into a mixed integer linear program (MILP) 
links, and obtain the social travel time of each com-
bination, respectively. The revenue threshold in Con-
straint 16 is set to be   as in the previous experiment.
The results are shown in Figure 3. Firstly, we con-
sider two extreme cases. If the numbers of toll and 
credit links are both 0, namely in the UE situation, 
the total travel time is 5.850 · 105. On the contrary, 
if the hybrid management is implemented in the en-
tire 8 toll links and 11 credit links, a minimum system 
travel time equivalent to the first-best system optimum 
situation can be achieved, i.e. the total travel time is 
5.725 · 105. The good news is that the system optimum 
can also be achieved with fewer toll links and credit 
links. As depicted in Figure 3, the system optimum can 
be obtained when the combinations of the numbers of 
toll links and credit links are (8,9), (8,10), (8,11), (7,9), 
(7,10), (7,11), (6,9), (6,10), (6,11), (5,10), and (5,11), 
respectively. Furthermore, in the hybrid management 
scheme, total travel time is more sensitive to the num-







































Figure 3 – Variation of system travel time with different toll 
links and credit links
Experiment C
The third example is to show the influence of rev-
enue requirement on the system travel time. Four 
situations have been set, when the combinations of 
numbers of toll links and credit links are (1, 11), (1, 0), 
(8, 11), and (8, 0), respectively. In the four situations, 
we examine the relationship between revenue require-
ment and total travel time. The results are shown in 
Figure 4. The results show that total travel time can only 
be reduced by decreasing the requirement of revenue.
When the number of credit link is 0 and the num-
ber of toll link is 1, the total travel time is always max-
imal in the four situations. Furthermore, in the situa-
tion, the total travel time increases remarkably with 
the increasing revenue requirement.
When the number of credit link is 11 and the num-
ber of toll link is 8, the total travel time is always mini-
mal in the four situations. In the situation, the required 
revenue is less than 2 · 105 for system optimum. The 
total travel time increases slowly when the revenue re-
quirement is higher than 2 · 105.
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Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the developed model and the effi-
ciency of the proposed algorithm. It is shown that the 
mixed management schemes can achieve favourable 
targets; namely, joint implementation of road tolls 
and tradable credits can effectively mitigate traffic 
congestion and meanwhile maintain reasonable rev-
enue for the private company. This experiment also 
shows that only applying tradable credit scheme can 
have a very acceptable improvement in terms of sys-
tem travel time reduction. Moreover, the system can 
be further improved by implementing toll charge, and 
system optimum can be achieved by charging only a 
subset of private links. Furthermore, in the hybrid man-
agement scheme, the total travel time is more sensi-
tive to the number of credit links than that of toll links. 
By comparing various situations, we can see that the 
sensitivity of revenue to total travel time is negatively 
related with the number of the toll and credit links.
In the paper, the purpose of management is to mit-
igate congestion, namely, by minimizing the system 
travel time, which can be seen in the upper-level mod-
els. Whether system optimum can be achieved or not, 
depends really on the structure of the private sub-net-
work and public sub-network, and more importantly it 
depends on the candidate sets of toll and credit links. 
If all links in the public sub-network are subject to 
credit charge and all links in the private sub-network 
are subject to toll charge, a system optimum is guar-
anteed.
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